КОГНИТИВ ТИЛШУНОСЛИК

TWO PERSPECTIVES ON LINGUISTICS IN UZBEKISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING, ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH

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Аннотация

Мақолада когнитив тилшунослик/дискурс таҳлилнинг лингвистик ва социологик аспектлари кўриб чиқилган. Унда таъкидланишича, когнитив тилшуносликнинг/дискурснинг лингвистик хусусиятлари ўзбек тилшунослари томонидан яхши ўрганилган бир пайтда уларнинг социологик аспектлари ҳамон етарли даражада тадқиқ этилмаган. Муаллиф мақолада когнитив тилшунослик/дискурснинг социологик жиҳатдан ўзига хос хусусиятларини ўрганишга ҳаракат қилган.

Аннотация

Статья рассматривает языковые и социологические аспекты когнитивной лингвистики/дискурса. При этом отмечается, что языковые особенности когнитивной лингвистики/дискурса хорошо обсуждены со стороны узбекских лингвистов, в то время как их социологические аспекты остаются малоизученными. Следовательно, в статье предпринимается попытка рассмотреть социологические особенности когнитивной лингвистики/дискурса.

Abstract

The article deals with the linguistic and sociological perspectives on Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis, noting that the former perspective is well discussed by Uzbek linguists, while the latter is left out of the debate. The article hence brings the sociological perspective on Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis to the fore.

Калит сўзлар: когнитив тилшунослик, дискурс, матн тилшунослиги, интерсубъективлик, ижтимоий репрезентация, нутқ актлари, деконструкция.

Ключевые слова: когнитивная лингвистика, дискурс, лингвистика текста, интерсубъективность, социальная репрезентация, речевые акты, деконструкция.

Keywords: cognitive linguistics, discourse, text linguistics, intersubjectivity, social representation, speech acts, deconstruction.

Introduction

This article discusses the latest trajectory of Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis in Uzbekistan, that is, how Cognitive Linguistics as a branch of General Linguistics and discourse analysis as a critical method got their institutionalization in the country. Since Cognitive Linguistics and discourse

analysis are mainly associated with linguistics, my reading of these fields will be carried out within the framework of the literature available in the library of the Uzbekistan State University of World Languages.

In this article, I will use Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis interchangeably since both these concepts place the construction of meanings in their dynamic context and both understand that meanings are intersubjectively shared social rules; both also assert that there is no mere correspondence between a statement and an objective reality; consequently, statements are the product of cognitive construction and discursive structures in a particular society. This is contrary to what we have come across so far within Saussurian Structural Linguistics; it tells us that language is an objective phenomenon and it exists out of individuals' interpretation, social constructions, and discourses. Meanings thus are constructed through association and negation with a system of signs in Structural Linguistics. In the article, both linguistic trends are compared to understand their fundamental differences.

The debate around Cognitive Linguistics/discourse analysis is diverse and ongoing. Different scholars give different definitions to Cognitive Linguistics/discourse analysis. While talking about these concepts, the book *Discourse and Context in Language Teaching* (17, 4) asserts that "At least two terms came to be used in parallel fashion: **text linguistics**, which focused on written texts from a variety of fields and genres, and **discourse analysis**, which entailed a more cognitive and social perspective on language use and communication exchanges and which included spoken as well as written discourse." Following this definition, I can conclude that Text Linguistics remains within the boundaries of text itself by focusing only on expressiveness, emotiveness and cohesion (anaphoric and cataphoric references) of written communication. On the other hand, Cognitive Linguistics/discourse analysis from a sociological perspective deals with individuals' social practices (e.g. social representation, speech acts) on how they construct *intersubjectively* meaningful signs in order to build the world we live in.

As noted earlier, the main argument of this article is Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis have been interpreted in post-Soviet Uzbekistan in the context of Text Linguistics, which focuses on the expressive, emotive and cohesive nature of written communications; Text Linguistics in turn is informed by Saussurian Structural Linguistics with the focus on how expressiveness and emotiveness are achieved within structured texts (i.e. the person-to-text mode of analysis). The article asserts that this type of focus is a minimalistic perspective of what Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis are as the methodologies. The present article hence introduces and discusses Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis from a sociological perspective, which deals with the concepts such as "intersubjectivity", "social representation", "speech acts", and "deconstruction" (i.e. the person-to-person mode of analysis); each of these concepts is discussed in the following sections.

To explain my argument put forth so far, the present article is structured into three main sections. The *first section* deals with the discussion of Text Linguistics and how it as a linguistic toolkit approaches written communications; this section

scrutinizes several writings of Uzbek linguists on the given topic. The *second section* introduces and discusses a sociological perspective on Cognitive Linguistics/discourse analysis; while doing so, this section demonstrates how the sociological approach goes beyond texts and sees how meanings are hierarchically structured and how speech acts construct the reality we live in. The *third section* gives some concrete examples on how one can teach and do a cognitive/discursive research about meaning constructions from a sociological perspective. The conclusion summarizes the key findings of the article.

1. Text Linguistics and its conceptual boundaries: a view from Uzbekistan

As mentioned above, Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis are interpreted in post-Soviet Uzbekistan in the context of Text Linguistics. Text Linguistics focuses on written texts from a variety of fields and genres, that is, the expressive, emotive and cohesive nature of written communications. For example, the book *Text Linguistics* (in the section of Cognitive Theory of Text), while mentioning the relationship between language patterns and mental structures, points at conceptualization and categorization of the world as key in Text Linguistics (1, 174). While doing so, the book, as an example, analyzes the text from "The Gift of the Magi" by O.Henry and concludes that "… this fragment actually presents the author's digression which correlating with the title, expresses the main concept of the story: true love is equaled to the wisdom of the magi" (1, 185). This analysis shows us what meaning the author of the text wanted to infuse.

While interpreting O.Henry's text, *Text Linguistics* employs the concept of foregrounding [see also Джусупов (2) to understand foregrounding theory], which "is associated with unexpectedness, surprise, and heightened attention. It marks out the most essential, relevant fragments of the text, thus guiding its interpretation" (1, 179). The most essential, relevant, fragments of the text, as foregrounding proposes, are convergence of stylistic devices, coupling (repetition of sounds, syllables, words, etc.), "strong" positions of the text (title, epigraph, end), and defeated expectancy (homonyms, rare words, archaisms, zeugma, pun, etc.) (1, 186). Here, within Text Linguistics, the cognitive/discursive aspects of the given text are mainly associated with the style, that is, expressiveness, emotiveness of the text and how the author uses these stylistic devices and semantic content of the text. *Text Linguistics* (1, 185) here asserts:

> The cognitive essence of the text is also confirmed by the fact that any text is intended to be understood and interpreted. In other words, it presupposes the cognitive activity aimed at revealing the semantic content of the text. The processes of perception, understanding and interpretation depend on the complicated cognitive mechanisms based on interaction of many factors … in cognitive linguistics perception is understood as a cognitive activity dealing with the cognitive processing of text information.

Text Linguistics correctly points out that any text, if to approach from a Cognitive Linguistics perspective, should be understood and interpreted (not just translated). These understanding and interpretation, however, are tied to a text itself and how this text makes certain expressiveness and emotiveness possible. Within

such interpretation, there is room for a cognitive process. But this cognitive process tries to interpret what a text has in terms of structured meanings, how words carry within themselves meanings in a text. This process of interpreting is not directed at revealing how individuals construct their own intersubjective meanings (the person-to-person activity), but at understanding how a text is emotively and expressively elaborated (the person-to-text activity). While the cognitive content depends on how individuals interpret this text pending time, space and social context, the "semantic content" of a text depends on the text itself and on the author's ability to write a colorful text. *Text Linguistics* thus concludes (1, 191):

So, from the linguistic and methodological points of view it is of paramount important to find in the text verbal signals, key words, signs, which promote the activation of knowledge structures as means for reaching interpretative goals. In this respect the role of anthroponyms which function in fiction as a stylistic device called antonomasia should be particularly signaled out.

Text Linguistics mentions that antonomasia calls forth a chain of associations in a text, thinking that associations as well as negation take place within the system of signs (see the discussion on Saussure in this section), which is independent of individuals' interpretations. The same assumption applies to other linguists. The book *Когнитив Тилшунослик* (3), which is regarded as one of the key textbooks on Cognitive Linguistics in Uzbekistan, talks about conceptualization and categorization as the main categories of cognitive linguistics. Like *Text Linguistics*, *Когнитив Тилшунослик* focuses on texts from a variety of fields and genres as well as from how words get their categorization based on other words within the given structure.

For example, *Когнитив Тилшунослик* points at the essential properties of objects to categorize within the linguistic structure. To categorize the concept of "birds", the book refers to such common attributes as "Lay eggs", "Two wings", "Two legs", and "Feathers". Under these common attributes the category members, according to the book, are "Robin", "Sparrow", "Dow", "Parrot", and "Ostrich" (3, 57-58). The sociological perspective on Cognitive Linguistics/discourse analysis, in additional to what has been said within Text Linguistics, teaches us how meanings and semantics are formed *intersubjectively*; that is, a categorized meaning does not depend on linking between a statement and empirical facts (e.g. "Lay eggs", "Two wings", "Two legs", "Feathers), but on accepting a particular meaning by individuals as true (i.e. deconstruction), even though this truth is not true based on empirical facts. As such, categorization within Cognitive Linguistics is a "human categorization", while in Text Linguistics such categorization takes place within the essential categories of an object and within a text to which an author contributes much from a stylistics perspective (i.e. foregrounding theory). This is clear from the example given in *Когнитив Тилшунослик*.

By referring to sentences such as "a) <u>all</u> elephants like peanuts" and "<u>all elephants like peanuts</u>" (3, 76), *Когнитив Тилшунослик* does a structural semantic analysis (see the discussion on Structural Linguistics in this section); it explores how stressing a word can create a particular meaning in the given text. Individuals (i.e. intersubjectivity) here are passive to construct a meaning, but independently existing

semantic rules can coordinate a meaning construction; thus individuals try to interpret these semantic rules rather than constructing and imposing a particular meaning on a text; here, the differences between **Text Linguistics** (a structural perspective on discourse) and **discourse analysis** (a sociological perspective on discourse) can be asserted. The next example is still the discourse analysis from a Text Linguistics perspective rather than it is a sociological approach to the text.

The textbook *Becoming a teacher. Trainee's Coursebook* (4, 72-73) in the activity of "Discourse and context" explores the following text, which is an example of a love letter. The text reads:

1…… I wish I had read your note before you went last night that I might have assured you how far I was from suspecting any coldness: You had a just right to be a little silent to one who speaks so plainly to you. 2. You must believe you shall, you will that I can do nothing say nothing think nothing of you but what has its spring in the Love which has so long been my pleasure and torment. 3. On the night I was taken ill when so violent a rush of blood came to my Lungs that I felt nearly suffocated – I assure you I felt it possible I might not survive and at that moment though(t) of nothing but you…

The quote given in the textbook *Becoming a teacher* is an activity to teach discourse from a Text Linguistics perspective. This is because that such discourse is informed by Structural Linguistics/Text Linguistics, which focuses on the style of the author and how he/she aesthetically describes the reality. Thus the textbook concludes (4, 72): "Much of its romance and charm comes from its apparent lack of surface coherence. Love letters should not be written like academic prose"; the question of prose is a choice between different functional styles rather than it is constructing or deconstructing meanings. Following this logic, the given task in *Becoming a teacher* is to conduct a discourse analysis from the viewpoint of the text itself; the task thus reads: "2. Discuss and write answers to the following questions. a. How many times do the words *you* or *your* appear in the first two sentences? b. What does the repetition of the word *you* suggest about the focus of his attention? How does it unify the prose? c. In sentence 1, he writes about a note from the woman: Do we know what was written in this note?". The discourse analysis here is about the text and to what extent this text is stylistically (6) and aesthetically ordered by the author. In fulfilling the task, students focus mainly on the style and genre, and by doing so, they remain within the text only. This is, however, different from a discourse analysis that takes a sociological perspective (see the next section for a detailed discussion).

Generally, suffice it to mention here, **Text Linguistics** focuses more on the style (emotiveness and expressiveness) of texts and how such texts are aesthetically organized by an author/writer; such a perspective draws upon Structural Linguistics as an emotive meaning within Stylistics does not depend on individual's interpretation, but on the style of a structured text (such an emotive meaning exists independently of individual's social construction). As we know well, Structural Linguistics is closely associated with the work of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913). In his *Course in General Linguistics* (6), Saussure develops the idea of conceptualized language as a structured system. By this statement, he

places the meaning construction within a system of signs; that is, language is not a function of the speaker, but it exists independently of speaker's interpretation, within the system of signs. Language does not originate in person; it is not a person-to-person activity. Rather, language is a system of signs that exists independently of peoples' understanding and interpretation of the world; language is an objectively existing structured text (i.e. the person-to-text activity).

The Saussurian Structural Linguistics, on which Text Linguistics is based, understands text within the structured, fixed systems of signs, i.e. fixed emotive structures such as lexical stylistic devices, syntactical stylistic devices, etc. In the example *she is a fox*, the metaphoric meaning of *fox* is fixed in the text/context and we only learn by heart what is fixed as the metaphoric meaning of *fox* (from text to person). Individuals are passive in creating meanings (i.e. the possibility of constructing a meaning based on "from person to text" is absent); meaningful structures are already fixed in dictionaries, texts, contexts, and a reader tries to understand an aesthetically ordered text. (Emotional) word/sign is composed of signifier (sound image) and signified (mental image); these correspond to each other in order to invoke a meaningful sign (such correspondence is arbitrary). This correspondence of both signifier and signified is an objective phenomenon since one signifier always causes one signified to make up a meaningful sign in the system; this meaningful sign has an identical significance to everyone within a society. The correspondence between signifier and signified is not caused by intersubjectivity and dynamism, that is, how people collectively agree to attach a new meaning to a particular object depending on time, space and social context in the course of symbolic, normative, argumentative, practical and discursive interactions (see the second section for a detailed discussion).

Structural Linguistics rather downgrades time, space, and social context, assuming that, for example, the rule of syntactical stylistic devices such as parallel construction is identical in the US as well as in Uzbekistan as it is supposed that such a parallel construction causes identical emotions and expressiveness everywhere, at least this is how we are taught from Galperin (5) to make such a conclusion. Identical meanings to everyone within a society are achieved due to the association and negation/opposition within a language. For example, the meaning of the word "man" depends on its opposition, that is, "woman" and on its association, that is, "human", "adult", "child", etc. This implies that within Structural Linguistics the value of a sign/word is determined by its surrounding (association), by what it is not in its surroundings (opposition). So the meaning of a sign is used because it is linked to signs in the system which are not this sign. For example, "red light" on the traffic light and "red light" on the door are not the same. These two "red lights" could be intelligible to everyone only on the background of other signs which are not the red light. Structured meanings are meanings that are constructed within opposition and association in a particular system of signs. As such, structural understanding of the world allows us to see the world identically in a way that a particular system of signs allows us to do so. Consequently, within Structural Linguistics, we are limited to meanings that dictionaries/structured rules allow us to construct the world. Dictionaries/structured (stylistic) rules in this sense are considered to be stable,

hence objective, that is, meanings are not affected by individuals' intersubjectivity, social representation, speech acts and deconstruction.

To achieve stability and objectivity in understanding the world, structural linguistics prioritizes sign (*langue*) over speech (*parole*). A sociological perspective on cognitive linguistics/discourse analysis does the opposite. The prioritized sign over speech means that langue informs parole; parole fits into the logic of langue. As such, individuals have no ability to affect the process of meaning construction, but meanings are constructed in association and opposition within a particular system of signs. Since langue gives meaning to parole, the former shapes the structures of the latter. Thus, as a method of analysis, Structural Linguistics mainly studies written texts; it is not interested in parole; the meanings of written texts then conform to the meanings that arise only from dictionaries/structured (stylistic) rules as well as from the fixed rules of grammar, syntax, stylistics, and semantics. The sociological approach to Cognitive Linguistics/discourse, on the other hand, prioritizes parole (intersubjectivity, social representation, speech act and deconstruction) over langue, about which I am going to talk in detail in the next section.

2. A sociological perspective on Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis

The previous section has discussed how cognitive and discursive analyses from a linguistic perspective are closely associated with Text Linguistics, which in turn is informed by Structural Linguistics while theorizing meaning construction. This section tries to go beyond this and theorize Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis from a sociological perspective. To do so means to go beyond texts and place analysis within a person-to-person horizon rather than the person-to-text one; such an analysis also unstructures what has been structured within Saussurian Structural Linguistics. Thus Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis from a sociological perspective deal mainly with such concepts as intersubjectivity, social representation, speech acts, and deconstruction (but it is not limited to these concepts). Why are these concepts important?

The concepts intersubjectivity, social representation, speech acts, and deconstruction criticize Structural Linguistics for its being limited as a methodology. This methodological limitation is characterized by the fact that Structural Linguistics, as mentioned so far, deals with only meanings that are constructed within and through association and opposition within a particular system of signs. This proposition represents the facts, which could only be observed, for example, "car". Unobservables such as "democracy", "state", "love", etc. are left out in this linguistic philosophy. The meanings of these unobservables do not exist independently of individuals' interpretation, that is, the meaning is in their use (8). We cannot understand the reality without our interpretation of this reality. Thus, within a sociological perspective on Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis, the meaning of a word is not determined by the essence of things (Aristotle) or essential ideals (Plato) that someone pictures; the meaning of a word is determined by its use intersubjectively. Thus the concept *intersubjectivity* first of all is key in

understanding Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis from a sociological perspective.

Intersubjectivity

The concept of *intersubjectivity* points at social, including linguistic, activities in-between at least two individuals; while Structural Linguistics prioritizes the person-to-text activity, intersubjectivity focuses on the person-to-person activity. Individuals are assumed to bring a particular meaning into being while interacting with each other. Such interactions could be symbolic (8), normative (9), argumentative (10), practical (11), and/or discursive (12). Such interactions always result in shared meanings/knowledge/identities. While interacting symbolically, normatively, argumentatively, practically, and discursively, individuals categorize and give meanings to objects and processes. This categorization is different from structural/materialistic categorization, which, as shown earlier in this article, focuses mainly on essential properties of objects.

Intersubjectivity points to the importance of nonlinguistic context that affects the way individuals categorize the same objects differently. For example, symbolic interactionism (13) pays attention to such symbolic interactions as handshaking, walking, dressing, attacking, fighting, and the like. Individuals/states while interacting look at these symbolic actions and decide what meaning to attach to a particular situation/object. They share meanings/knowledge/identity as a result of these mentioned (but not limited to) symbolic interactions. They act based on what they share for a particular time, space and context in the course of symbolic interactions. Thus meanings are not fixed in dictionaries, and neither are they structured in terms of association/opposition. Thus different situations/objects can get different meanings depending on how and what symbolic meanings are exchanged at a particular time and space. For example, International Relations scholars point at such symbolic meanings as the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, an asymmetric cut in nuclear and conventional forces, etc., while reasoning how and why the international anarchy between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was ended in 1991 (14).

Meaning construction from the viewpoint of normative intersubjectivity/interaction implies that collective social knowledge in terms of "ought to" in a particular society shapes meanings; "oughts" and "ought nots" constitute and regulate individuals and how they interact with each other and attach a particular meaning to a situation/object. Thus, the meaningful reality is characterized by an intersubjectively rule-governed oughts such as, for example, "democracy", "sovereignty", "nonintervention", "territorial integrity", "antiterrorism"; these oughts and ought nots are regulated by normativity; that is, what is right is internalized among individuals within a particular historical time and space. In this regard, the social meaningful life is looked at through the lens of "the actor's capacity to attach the 'right' meaning to a social event depends on the capacity to share a system of meanings within the society" (15, 162). The social life is characterized by collective expectations for the proper behavior of individuals (e.g. a legitimate/appropriate behavior); for normative intersubjectivity, norms are thus systemic level variables that are shared intersubjectively at a macro-level (9).

Argumentative intersubjectivity, on the other hand, focuses on the process of arguing/truth-seeking, within which three social situations are under scrutiny: a) truth – what is said should be based on facts, that is, on rational experiments (in the era of rationality) as well as on theories, and paradigms, which are regarded to be true in a particular society; truth is not objectively given (Structural Linguistics claims the contrary), but socially accepted as true and meaningful. b) Normative rightness – what is said is true based on existing moral norms, which are activated and applicable to a particular situation in the course of practical argumentation. c) Truthfulness/sincerity – a person who claims his/her arguments to be true should have a merit in terms of his/her past deeds (16). These social situations are called validity claims; meanings/norms are shared and understandable (communicative rationality) once these claims are validated in the process of argumentation. Individuals agree on the meaning of a word/object/situation once these three claims are activated and validated (10). Much discussion in the framework of the argumentative intersubjectivity relates to *coherence*. According to Celce-Murcia and Olshtain (17, 125):

Coherence is the quality that makes a text conform to a consistent world view based on one's experience and culture or convention, and it should be viewed as a feature related to all three participants in the interactive process: the writer, the written text, and the reader. The notion of coherence thus incorporates ways and means by which ideas and propositions in a text are presented conceptually. It is the result of the writer's plan and relates to the discourse world of written texts, to pragmatic features, and to a content area; it usually fits a conventionally and culturally acceptable rhetorical organization, sequence, and structure.

Coherence of a text is secured not by fixed and objectively given meanings, but by truth, rightness, and sincerity in the course of argumentative reasoning in-between individuals. Individuals understand each other and validate their claims also because they share (extralinguistic/extratextual) knowledge, in particular shared norms, rules, and theories. Celce-Murcia and Olshtain (17, 11) assert that:

In a communicative exchange both interactants rely on their prior knowledge, which may or may not be shared. Shared knowledge perhaps is most important for everyday communicative exchanges. When such exchanges take place between participants who are familiar with each other, they rely on their shared knowledge.

On the other hand, discourse analysis in the context of practical intersubjectivity prioritizes practical knowledge (*habitus*) to understand meaning construction. Such a practical knowledge (11, 273) consists of collective dispositions and experiences embodied in their *habitus*. This *habitus* is the past (inarticulate) experiences of individuals actualized into present. Intersubjective practical dispositions are associated with inarticulate know-how (tacit knowledge) that makes what is to be done self-evident or commonsensical. Social meaningful action then emanates from this inarticulate know-how (11, 258). The sum of such social meaningful action is characterized by the communities of practices which are

defined as a group of like-minded people that are constituted in and through shared practices (18, 15).

Discursive intersubjectivity, on the other hand, explores such extra-linguistic factors as illocutionary and perlocutionary acts (see also the speech act part in this section); shared meanings are achieved in the course of intersubjective discursive reasoning within which conceptual boundaries of an object/situation is defined and established (12). Individuals discuss topics and argue about problematic questions; while doing so, they exchange (illocutionary and perlocutionary) acts. Thus meaning construction is not the result of correspondence between speech and an empirical fact, but between speech (illocutionary) and a response (perlocutionary).

Generally, intersubjectivity, whether it is symbolic or normative, makes us look into extra-linguistic factors to understand how meanings are constructed and reconstructed. A researcher who conducts cognitive/discourse analysis from a sociological perspective should primarily scrutinize the mentioned factors/variables to test a hypothesis or to understand a meaningful social action.

Social representation

The term *social representation* was originally coined by French social psychologist Serge Moscovici in 1961. Social representation is understood as the collective elaboration "of a social object by the community for the purpose of behaving and communicating" (19, 251). Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis from a sociological perspective, as mentioned earlier, focus on how individuals, while interacting – symbolic, normative, argumentative, practical and discursive interactions – with each other, construct and elaborate meanings and impose these meanings on objects/subjects/processes upon which they act. As such, meanings are not structured and fixed; they are neither the result of opposition and association, as structural linguistics teaches us.

Objects, subjects and processes are not clear to us unless they are collectively elaborated and named; German-American social psychologist Kurt Lewin, who studied group dynamics and social perceptions, stated that "Reality for the individual is, to a high degree, determined by what is socially accepted as reality" (20, 28). Individuals interpret and understand the world they live in via representations that they construct while interacting with each other. Social representations are the categories that exist prior to individuals' understanding of the world; as such, these representations help us understand, draw conceptual boundaries while we interpret the world. Moscovici states (21, 23-24):

Nobody's mind is free from the effects of the prior conditioning which is imposed by his representations, language and culture. We think, by means of a language; we organize our thoughts, in accordance with a system which is conditioned both by our representations and by our culture. … all the images and all the descriptions which circulate within a society, even the scientific ones, imply a link with previous systems and images, a stratification in the collective memory and a reproduction in the language, which invariably reflects past knowledge, and which breaks the bounds of current information.

Social representations carry within themselves meanings that have been internalized within a collectivity in the past; we are part of these representations; we

cannot think out of the conceptual boundaries that these representations draw; while we make speech and attach meanings on objects we are informed by these representations, which are actualized in the present. Thus our modern society is characterized by the sum of social representations which are constructed in the past and which actualized in the present. Moscovici mentions that before the Middle Ages our society was based on sacred principles. "Now it is consensual. In such a consensual society there is a continual need to reconstitute 'common sense'" that makes sense of objects, subjects, and processes. "A consensual society is seen as a free group of individuals who put forth opinions and shape society… Representations help make the unfamiliar familiar"; language here acts as consensual tool to compose a society. "To categorize someone or something amounts to choosing a paradigm form those stored in our memory and establishing a positive or negative relation with it" (22). Thus, the construction of a particular consensual society means defining the positive meaning of "We" in the context of a negative "Them". It is exactly this point American literary theorist Edward Said analyzed in his famous book *Orientalism* (24).

The book *Orientalism* starts with a quote "They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented"; this quote implies that the history of meaning making with regard to societies has been the practice of social representation. The book discusses how the scholarly writings of America and Europe misinterpreted the image/concept of the East by social representations (i.e. vocabularies, metaphors, and clichés) during the 16th-20th centuries. Said argued that the meaning of the East was defined by these scholarly writings by drawing conceptual boundaries between the civilized West ("We") and the uncivilized East ("Them"). This social representation carries within itself the Western truth, hence the power of control (i.e. cultural domination) by the West towards the East; this representation (as a form of power) thus hinders a true understanding of the East, its culture, meaning, identity, etc.; and this representation constructed the Western society with negative meanings, ideas, and images with regard to the East. If to apply this discussion to linguistics, this book shows how meanings are constructed by scholars, travelers, people in power by virtue of their interpretations/social representations of the East; this is contrary to what Structural Linguistics teaches, saying that meanings are fixed within the system of signs and such meanings are prior to individuals' interpretations/social representations.

In another book *Representations of the Intellectual*s (24), Said shows how intellectuals, scholars, experts, etc. contribute to the formation of meanings via social representations (i.e. through vocabularies, metaphors, and clichés); as such, these intellectuals, scholars, experts hold the (cultural) power, through which a consensual society is established, legitimized and controlled. From a sociological perspective on Cognitive Linguistics/discourse, *power*, *legitimization* and *control* are produced through social representations that intellectuals make to a public. Said says (24, 11), "The central fact for me is, I think, that the intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public." The same is true for Campbell (25), who in his book *Writing Security* shows how representation of

danger posed by other states establishes the meaning/identity of the United States in terms of civilized vs. uncivilized, democratic vs. undemocratic, etc. Thus, for Campbell, the security as a discourse is written (by employing certain normative concepts, metaphors, clichés) in the foreign policy documents of the United States. Such writings do not necessarily correspond to the empirical facts on the ground, but socially represent certain ideas on others.

Speech acts

The development of speech acts goes back to British philosopher of language John Austin. In his famous book *How to do things with words* (26), Austin showed us that individuals use language not just to assert something (constatives), but also to *do* things with words (performatives). By this, Austin distinguished the difference between constatives and performatives. Constatives are utterances which describe the reality "outside there", and therefore could be judged in accordance with the true/false criteria. For example, the sentence "this is a car" can have a meaning (is meaningful to all of us) based on whether we see it or not (senses of perception); that is, we can say that this is a true sentence depending on our seeing it; the existence of this car is not necessarily linked to the interpretations/representations of individuals; neither does it belong to their intersubjective shared knowledge. Our senses of perception verify the truthfulness of this sentence. The truth of this sentence does not depend on our interpretation of this car, i.e. intersubjectivity, but on seeing it. Senses of perception are objective, while interpretation is intersubjective. The utterances which could be judged in terms of true or false could easily be explained by Structural Linguistics; they can be analyzed within traditional semantics, grammar, stylistics, etc.

On the other hand, performatives (i.e. speech acts) are those utterances which could NOT be assessed in terms of the true/false dichotomy. These performatives rather bring a particular social effect by being uttered. The truthfulness of performatives depends on a speaker as well as a hearer (the person-to-person activity); they both by what they share (i.e. shared knowledge) contribute to the meaningfulness of utterances. Celce-Murcia and Olshtain mention (17, 24) that "successful communication takes place when speakers share knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions and when they adhere to similar rules of cooperative interaction". For example, "I promise to do it tomorrow", the institution of "promise", if it is not shared and does not adhere to similar rules (felicity conditions), such as "the hearer believes that the speaker can fulfill the promised act" (the factor of belief), "the hearer really wants the speaker to fulfill this promised act" (the factor of desire), "the breach of the promised act entails social consequences within a group and the interactants are well informed about these consequences" (the factor of shared expectations), is not meaningful. Without the hearer's desire, belief and shared expectations, the speaker's promise is not meaningful, even if this sentence – "I promise to do it tomorrow" – is correct syntactically, stylistically, and grammatically. Aside from "promise", some performative verbs are (26): "apologize", "compliment", "request", "warn", "insist", "forbid", "threaten", and so on. Searle (27) groups these verbs into assertives, directives, commissives,

expressives, declarations (see also Azizov (28) for a detailed discussion of these speech act groups).

To "promise" does not describe the world, but by promising, a speaker performs an act directed towards other people (30). Speaking means performing certain acts because such a speaking activates certain rules and makes individuals be constituted within these rules. Searle says (27, 17) that theory of language is part of a theory of action, simply because speaking is a rule-governed form of behaviour. According to Austin (26, 6, 9-10), our speaking/speech acts are our responsibilities; while performing these acts, we bear responsibilities in front of others. For example, to the question of a priest, "do you take X to be your wife?", a groom's answer "yes, I do" does not just describe the reality, but imposes on the bride and groom new moral obligations and responsibilities to act upon. Thus speech acts are meaningful within existing social rules, norms, institutions (i.e. wedding as a social institution), conventions, and so on.

Habermas (16) talks about three social situations, mentioned earlier, within which speech acts get their meanings [See also Grice (31) to understand his cooperative principles in communications]: the claims for truth, rightness, and truthfulness/sincerity, called the three universal validity claims. The communication between a speaker and a hearer is constituted by the existence of these claims. According to Habermas, in the course of communication, individuals exchanging speech acts refer to the validity claims to make their utterances meaningful to each other. Communicative consensus/rationality is only achieved in the context of these validity claims. For example, student's rejection – "no, I cannot bring water because the water tab is in the other seminar room" – to his professor is meaningful (the professor accepts student's argument as true) because they both refer to the normative rightness such as "one does not disturb other people" (30, 2, 11); in a different context (for example, in the street near the public water tab) this rejection of the student to the professor could have been meaningless. In the course of argumentative reasoning by referring to the normative rightness, they both achieve an understanding; the student's rejection is meaningful only within the existing normative rules and institutions; the student validates his normative claims in the course of communicative rationality. This is contrary to what Saussurian Structural Linguists teaches us that meanings are fixed within the system of signs; they are static and prior to individuals' communicative interactions; individuals just "pick up" words fixed with particular meanings in the dictionary and use them in order to transfer meanings. Speech acts show how Structural Linguistics is limited in terms of understanding meaning construction from a sociological perspective and in terms of how a language is seen as a social action.

Deconstruction

The last concept that helps explain the foundations of Cognitive Linguistics/(critical) discourse analysis is deconstruction; this deconstruction along with other aforementioned concepts will contribute to reveal the (social) meaningfulness of utterances. The concept deconstruction is closely associated with critical discourse analysis (29), which is aimed at deconstructing and exposing "social inequality as expressed, constituted, and legitimized through language use –

notably in the public media such as newspapers, radio, television, films, cartoons, and the like" (17, 10). Baxter (32, 126) points out that critical discourse analysis and its toolkit deconstruction "considers how language works within institutional and political discourses (e.g. in education, organization, media, government), as well as specific discourses (around gender and class), in order to uncover overt or more often, covert inequalities in social relations."

Deconstruction "challenges binary thinking that tends to structure thoughts in oppositional pairs, placing one term over the other. … [Deconstruction classifies] subjects of study into two categories: the *more* powerful, those (people, groups, systems) who wield power over others; and the *less* powerful, or those who suffer its abuse" (32, 131). Binary/hierarchical opposition/thinking, according to Derrida (33), is how social reality is structured; it is how meanings of things are imposed; it is how things hence got their oppressed meanings. Derrida (34, 41) says that "…in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with a peaceful coexistence of a *vis-à-vis*, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand." Foucault's deconstruction further continues to understand how these opposed meanings/violent hierarchies got/are getting their normalization (cultural attitudes) in a society within different historical times.

In his *Madness and Civilization* (35, 9-10, 14, 17, 31, 37), Foucault explores institutions, arts, literature which interpreted the meaning of madness in Western history. He asserts that in the later years of the Middle Ages (the classical age) the meaning of madness was tied to a figure in comedy and literature in European culture, that is, Ship of Fools, was an allegory in Western literature to mean an ignorance; madness, in Shakespeare, is discoursed as death that is beyond doctor's practice and a treatment, but of divine mercy. The meaning of madness, the attitude to it starts to change with the foundation in 1656 of the General Hospital in Paris within which madness was institutionalized (the period of the Renaissance). This shows how the Western society was structured differently in different periods in terms of the concept of madness. For Foucault, the key term is *confinement* which has a massive phenomenon; it is reified in different institutions (from prison to hospital); it is in these institutions that science serves to power and legitimize these institutions in their activity. These institutions via how they record the statistics (on madness) establish hierarchical oppositions/binary meanings within a society (36).

For Foucault, the binary meanings are structured in discourse/discursive formations; for example, the discourse on madness. Discourse, from a Foucauldian perspective, "is a type of [hierarchically structured] language, idea and statement which expresses certain types of understanding, values and perceptions that allow us to make sense of things" (37, x). According to Foucault, the meaning of language, that is, words, statements, symbols, metaphors, are not immediately obvious (Structural Linguistics asserts the contrary); they mean different things in different contexts and times. "The meaning of a particular statement depends on who is saying it and how it is being said, but also on how it fits into an existing wider pattern of statements, symbols and understandings" (38, 10). This existing wider pattern of statements, symbols and understandings is called "discourse" that needs to be

deconstructed in order to be understood. Material things acquire meanings within discourses: political speeches, films, music, etc. From a Foucauldian perspective, these political speeches, films, music, etc. are hieratically structured and, as such, hegemonic power[7] relations are established within a society; to deconstruct means then to understand these hierarchically structured meanings as well as "…hegemonic power relations inscribed within texts" (32, 132).

In her *Decolonizing Methodologies* (39), Linda Smith shows how the Western scholarly imaginative writings established hierarchically structured methodologies (i.e. the binary methodological categories of western thought) that have been applied to understand colonized/indigenous peoples. These imaginative writings, according to Smith (39, 28), dismissed the systems of order of indigenous societies through "a series of negations: they were not fully human, they were not civilized enough to have systems, they were not literate, their languages and modes of thoughts were inadequate." Smith shows how these marginalized, "Othered" ideas about indigenous peoples were materialized through such concepts as "Indian", "Aborigine", "Fourth World Peoples", etc.:

> Views about the Other had already existed for centuries in Europe, but during the Enlightenment these views became more formalized through science, philosophy and imperialism, into explicit systems of classification and "regimes of truth". The racialization of the human subject and the social order enabled comparisons to be made between the "us" of the west and the "them" of the Other (39, 32).

Smith shows how meanings that sustain societies, cultures, institutions, methodologies are structured hierarchies which are centered on the idea of Self/Other relations. To deconstruct means to understand how these "Others" are constructed through languages by referring to the "Self". Within a language, if we regard it as a cognitive category, the "Self" always seeks for a dangerous "Other" outside of the national territories (25). For Hopf (40) however, this search for an "Other" happens at a domestic level within daily discursive practices of individuals in a particular society, i.e. evaluative and normative discussions in newspapers, journals, books, research writings, university curricular, TV programs, etc. This search results in the construction of multiple kinds of others such as characters from our own past, from cultural narratives, historical others, etc. Hopf considers language, structured into the Self/Other relations, as a cognitive structure that secures social order in a society and makes things predictable to them, i.e. there is no reality outside of this cognitive structure/language. This is how language from a sociological perspective functions, as the discussed scholars show us.

3. Teaching Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis from a sociological perspective

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[7] *Power* for Foucault is not a thing that is used by individuals. But, it is a complex flow of relations between different groups that produces what we are and what we can do. From this comes the idea of *knowledge* that is perspectives, ideas, narratives, rules, categories, laws, terms, explanations and definitions produced by disciplines through the application of scientific principles. Hence, this knowledge allows the power to sustain certain type of relations that produce what we are and what we can do (37, xii-xiv).

So far the article has discussed how oral and written texts could be approached methodologically; in doing so, it mentioned two sides of Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis, **Text Linguistics** from a structural perspective and **Cognitive Linguistics/discourse analysis** from a sociological perspective. In that, the article has asserted that while Text Linguistics prioritizes the person-to-text mode of research, Cognitive Linguistics/discourse analysis prioritizes a sociological perspective based on the person-to-person mode.

The person-to-text mode of research informs us that meanings are fixed in the system of signs; these meanings then are scrutinized with the help of such concepts/toolkits as repetition of sounds, syllables, words, homonyms, rare words, archaisms, zeugma, pun, parallel constructions, cohesion (anaphoric and cataphoric references), etc. To use and to teach these concepts/toolkits in an analysis means to pose such questions, for example, as: how many times do the words *XXX* appear in the first two sentences? What does the repetition of the word *X* suggest about the focus of his/her attention? How does the word *X* unify the prose? How is text *X* aesthetically organized by an author/writer (see section one for a detailed discussion).

On the other hand, following the discussion on Cognitive Linguistics/discourse from a sociological perspective, the person-to-person mode of analysis focuses on such concepts/toolkits as intersubjectivity, social representation, speech acts, and deconstruction. Generally, these concepts assume that meanings are constructed as a result of the dynamic person-to-person social activities, and then these constructed meanings are imposed on objects, subjects and processes upon which actions are taken. Such an analysis goes beyond text and looks into such variables as social norms, rules, personal history, collective memory, validity claims, felicity conditions, *habitus*, hierarchical structures, power, truth, Self/Other relations, etc. These variables can be found not only in texts (books, journals, laws, archival documents, etc.), but also in oral history, the memory of individuals, existing institutions, films, paintings, as well as in the social dynamics in-between individuals. Language from a sociological perspective sees these variables as key in constructing meanings. To understand the meaning construction from a sociological perspective is an additional communicative competence to what American sociolinguist Dell Hymes proposed in the 1970s.

As is well-established, Dell Hymes (41), while arguing with Chomsky's underlying linguistic competence, [8] introduced the term "communicative competence". In that, he noted (32, 118):

> … a person who has only linguistic competence would be quite unable to communicate – a "social monster" producing grammatical sentences disconnected from the context in which they occurred. The notion of a communicatively competent speaker and writer, who knows the rules of how to communicate appropriately in different social settings, has had a profound effect on linguistics with an interest in the field of discourse analysis.

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[8] According to Celce-Murcia and Olshtain (17, 16), "Linguistic or grammatical competence, which consists of the basic elements of communication: sentence patterns, morphological inflections, lexical resources, and phonological or orthographic systems".

This is true that to be a competent speaker and writer as well as researcher one should be able to communicate appropriately and understand/interpret meaning constructions in different social settings. However, as I have argued so far, an understanding of meaning construction in different social settings is not limited only to the person-to-text mode of teaching/researching; such meaning constructions should also be understood at the person-to-person level of teaching and researching. I will give one further example of how Edward Said examines meaning constructions at the person-to-person level.

Said (23) who employs social representation, speech acts, and deconstruction toolkits examines the speech of Arthur James Balfour made in 1910 at the House of Commons of the U.K. parliament. Analyzing Balfour's speech (he reads the text closely), Said emphasizes its inconsistency by saying

> England knows Egypt; Egypt is what England knows; England knows that Egypt cannot have self-government; England confirms that by occupying Egypt; for the Egyptians, Egypt is what England has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes "the very basis" of contemporary Egyptian civilization; Egypt requires, indeed insists upon, British occupation (23, 34).

The established nature of the vocabularies of "we" (England) are "civilized", "good" and "they" (Egypt) are "uncivilized", "bad" construct meanings via the social representation practices of Balfour. Prior to interaction (to the East itself), the hierarchically ordered norms, rules, and speech acts (the "Self" vs. the "Other") defined the language structures between the West and the East. For example, the speech act of Balfour like "we are committed to civilize them" (with its felicity conditions such as then Prime Minister is speaking, the audience is unfamiliar with the discussed topic and that is why it is interested in it, etc.) established the stable cognitive structure and regulated relationships between the West and the East. In his discourse analysis, Said also pays attention to how the concepts and metaphors (see also Lakoff and Johnson (42) to understand how metaphors construct the social reality) shaped in the West (including with the help of Balfour's speech acts) about the East were disseminated within wider masses. This dissemination usually took place through the books written in the West by citing of the same authors in others books (i.e. intertextuality).

What Said says in terms of quoting the same authors and the employment of the same nature of language, i.e. the same evaluative vocabularies, metaphors, clichés, even though with different subjects of discussion, is the "system of representation" and imagination (23, 203). Said in his discourse analysis also draws our attention to the importance of deeper analysis of styles of language to understand identities, rules, norms. In doing so, he demonstrates that not only vocabularies, metaphors, and clichés (nouns, adjectives) can reveal imaginative realities, but also verbs that could make functioning of the nouns and adjectives in terms of interpreting of these realities. For example, by quoting a typical passage from Duncan Macdonald's classic work *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam* (23, 247):

The Arabs show themselves not as especially easy of belief, but as hard-headed, materialistic, questioning, doubting, scoffing at their own superstitions and usages, fond of tests of the supernatural – and all this in a curiously light-minded, almost childish fashion,

Said concludes (23, 247):

that 'the governing verb is *show*, which here gives us to understand that the Arabs display themselves (willingly or unwillingly) to and for expert scrutiny. The number of attributes ascribed to them, …, causes 'the Arabs' to acquire a sort of existential weightlessness; … What Macdonald also implies is that for such descriptions there is a peculiarly privileged position occupied by Western Orientalists, whose representative function is precisely *to show* what needs to be seen.

Another example, in which Said quotes Sania Hamady's *Temperament and Character of the Arabs* (23, 309-310):

The Arabs so far have demonstrated an incapacity for disciplined and abiding unity. They experience collective outbursts of enthusiasm but do not pursue patiently collective endeavors, which are usually embraced half-heartedly. They show lack of coordination and harmony in organization and function, nor have they revealed an ability for cooperation. Any collective action for common benefit or mutual profit is alien to them,

Said again concludes (23, 74):

The style of this prose tells more perhaps than Hamady intends. Verbs like "demonstrate," "reveal," "show," are used without an indirect object: to whom are the Arabs revealing, demonstrating, showing? To no one in particular, obviously, but to everyone in general. This is another way of saying that these truths are self-evident only to a privileged or initiated observer, since nowhere does Hamady cite generally available evidence for her observations.

According to Said, the language (metaphors, nouns, verbs) that the "Self" uses to give a normative evaluation about the "Other" can be arbitrary in terms of creating realities (23, 53-55):

…mind requires order, and order is achieved by discriminating and taking note of everything, placing everything of which mind is aware in a secure, refundable place… It is perfectly possible to argue that some distinctive objects are made by the mind, and that these objects, while appearing to exist objectively, have only a fictional reality. A group of people living on a few acres of land will set up boundaries between their land and its immediate surroundings and the territory beyond, which they call "the land of the barbarians." In other words, this universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is "ours" and an unfamiliar space beyond "ours" which is "theirs" is a way of making geographical distinctions that can be entirely arbitrary. I use the word "arbitrary" here because imaginative geography of the "our land-barbarian land" variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for "us" to set up these boundaries in our minds; "they" become "they" accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from "ours." … For

there is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away.

Generally, the cognitive/discourse analysis from a sociological perspective that Said uses shows us how language acts as an active social artifact (in Structural Linguistics it is passive) in constructing the reality; there is a hierarchically structured language (nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc.) between peoples and other peoples, objects, processes; this type of language is *intersubjectively and hierarchically* constructed, shared and structured within one society to understand others (Self/Other relations), and this language is arbitrary, there is no natural connection between what is said and to what this saying is attached.

The type of analysis that Said uses teaches us how we can analyze and teach texts, communication, the process of meaning creation from a sociological perspective; nouns, metaphors, verbs, sentence structures are not just there to analyze in terms of their grammar, emotionality and expressiveness, but how these texts and sentence structures produce and reproduce the reality, meanings, identity, power relations, etc.; how meanings get their power and dissemination in wider masses; how one meaning gets its priority over the other and what the felicity conditions are to establish this priority; how words, sentences and texts marginalize other peoples, and how and what conceptual boundaries are drawn between nations. To know this type of analysis enhances one's communicative competence in terms of being able to control meanings, to reveal the hidden contextual purpose and intentions of an author by referring to wider masses within a particular society.

Conclusion

The article concludes that the meaningfulness of oral and written communications could be revealed by exploring their structural (Text Linguistics) as well as sociological (Cognitive Linguistics/discourse) properties. To know both enhances one's communicative competence in terms of understanding how meanings are constructed at the linguistic as well as sociological levels. The article however has differentiated Text Linguistics from Cognitive Linguistics/discourse analysis. While Text Linguistics prioritizes *langue* over *parole*, thus actualizes the person-to-text mode of analysis, Cognitive Linguistics/discourse analysis from a sociological perspective does the opposite, pointing at the importance of the person-to-person mode (i.e. intersubjectivity, social representation, speech acts, deconstruction). The article has asserted that both methodological approaches are right on their own; they approach meaning construction from their own conceptual apparatus. The article has showed how Text Linguistics analyzes meaning construction, and in the context of this linguistics, it has brought to the fore Cognitive Linguistics and discourse analysis from a sociological perspective. The latter is a new linguistic perspective to Uzbekistan, and within this article it is impossible to discuss all aspects (e.g. how to integrate Cognitive Linguistics into teaching process) of this mode of analysis. Thus, in future academic articles, I wish that this type of sociological approach to linguistics could get a close attention.

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